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In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the philosopher Robert Nozick describes 
what he calls an “Experience Machine.”
1
In essence, it produces a form of 
virtual reality (VR). People can use it to immerse themselves in a custom-
designed dream: They have the experience of climbing a mountain, reading 
a book, or conversing with a friend when they are actually lying isolated in 
a tank with electrodes feeding perceptions into their brain. Nozick describes 
the Experience Machine as part of a philosophical thought experiment—one 
designed to show that a valuable life consists of more than mental states, 
like those we receive in this machine. As Nozick says, “we want to do cer-
tain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.”2 An 80-year se-
quence of experiences generated by the machine would not be of equivalent 
value to the lifetime of the identical set of experiences we derive from inter-
* Alan Joseph Bennett Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. Thanks to the 
organizers of, and participants in, the Science Fiction and the Law Panel at the 2021 meeting 
of the Association of American Law Schools: Nicholson Price, Deven Desai, Dan Brean, Ca-
milla Hrdy, Vickie Sutton, and John Scalzi. And thanks to Lindsay Grizzard, Averyn Lee, 
Erin Wall, and the editors of the Michigan Technology Law Review for comments on, and ed-
its to, this essay.
1. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42 (Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
1999) (1974).
2. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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actions with real people (who are not illusions, but have minds of their 
own), and with a physical universe that lies outside of us. On the contrary, 
says Nozick, a solipsistic life in the Experience Machine is a deeply impov-
erished one.
But even if substituting the Experience Machine’s fantasies for real life 
is not a valuable use of our time, is it something that the government should 
be able to regulate? The First Amendment protects our right to spend our 
time reading books that the government might deem meritless. It protects, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Society, our 
right to play violent video games the government believes to be a negative 
influence on children.
3
Most courts and scholars to address the matter be-
lieve that if speech is staunchly protected, the realm of unexpressed thought 
and imagination deserves even stronger insulation from government inter-
ference.
4
As Neil Richards writes, “if there is any constitutional right which 
is absolute,” it is the freedom of thought.
5
A government that could control 
our dreams, for example, would be one deeply at odds with our constitu-
tional order. One might thus argue that however unwise it may be to let pro-
grammed dreams or other false realities swallow much of our experience, 
our First Amendment right to “freedom of thought,” “freedom of mind,” or 
“cognitive liberty”
6
requires that the government stand back and let us do 
so. In fact, I have provided a qualified defense of this claim in past scholar-
ship.
7
But a closer look quickly reveals that this inquiry is not quite so 
straightforward: VR-generated experience may well be more worrisome 
when it is designed not merely as an entertaining break from reality, but as a 
replacement for it—that is, when it is designed to be perceived by someone 
as real. In the Experience Machine, Nozick writes, “you won’t know that 
you’re there; you’ll think it’s all actually happening.” The First Amendment 
gives us a right to spend time in daydreams or fantasies.
8
But it is less clear 
that it gives us a right to use VR technology to weaken or suspend our abil-
ity to distinguish fact from fiction. There are also other emerging technolo-
gies we can use to similarly alter our sense of what is real: Scholars have 
3. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
4. See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 595, 618 (1942) (in which both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions contrasted the “absolute” or “illimitable” right to think, with the 
necessarily more limited right to express such thoughts).
5. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408 (2008).
6. See generally Richard Glen Boire, On Cognitive Liberty (Part 1), J. COGNITIVE 
LIBERTIES, Winter 1999/2000, at 7.
7. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in 
Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2008).
8. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (stating that the “fanta-
sies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government”).
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written about technology erasing memory or implanting false memories.
9
Although we cannot currently alter the whole of our experience, today’s ar-
tificial intelligence allows us to create “deepfake” variants of video and au-
dio which show footage of events that never occurred.
10
Of course, freedom of thought entails a right to believe in falsehoods. 
When people swear that the earth is flat or firmly believe in the fantasies of 
9/11 truthers or QAnon, the government cannot constitutionally coerce them 
to think otherwise. As the Supreme Court said in 1969, “[o]ur whole consti-
tutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to 
control men’s minds.”
11
But does it likewise rebel at the thought of giving 
the government power to limit how we shape our minds with Experience 
Machines, or other VR devices? Does it let the government restrict the tech-
nologies we might use to create and implant false memories to reinforce our 
false beliefs? Or, perhaps, recruit others to design “deepfake” videos that 
vividly—and convincingly—show us and others a world we would like to 
believe in?
This short essay seeks to suggest some tentative answers for these ques-
tions, drawing not primarily on the court cases or legal writings, but rather 
on the work of Philip K. Dick and to a lesser extent, on that of other science 
fiction writers. Virtual (or other artificial) reality was a central theme of sci-
ence fiction even before the foundations for computer-generated virtual re-
ality were laid in the mid-1960s. Stanley Weinbaum’s 1935 story, Pygmali-
on’s Spectacles, imagined a kind of glasses that would display a movie 
providing “sight and sound . . . taste, smell, and touch.”
12
A 1964 essay by 
Stanislaw Lem on what he called “phantomatics” imagined a false perceptu-
al reality that entered not through glasses, but through “ocular, olfactory, 
tactile, and other stimuli” fed directly to a person’s brain.
13
And for decades, 
Philip K. Dick made similar technologies, along with the confusion and dis-
9. See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2006).
10. Legal scholars have only recently begun to explore the First Amendment status of 
deepfakes. See, e.g., Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge 
for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2019); Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 110 (2018); 
Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1447 (2019); Mary 
Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech 
Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 895 (2019); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed 
Justices: American Election Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 542 
(2020).
11. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
12. See STANLEY GRAUMAN WEINBAUM, PYGMALIAN’S SPECTACLES 25 (1935) (in 
which the character has emotional interactions with others in a world produced by “trick pho-
tography, but stereoscopic . . . three dimensional.”); Roya Bagheri, Virtual Reality: The Real 
Life Consequences, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 101, 104–05 (2016) (discussing the way this sto-
ry anticipated modern virtual reality).
13. PETER SWIRSKI, A STANISLAW LEM READER 76 (1997).
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orientation they could generate, a central theme in his writings. Dick ex-
plored the tremendous value such artificial realities could provide to indi-
viduals—the sustenance, richness, and freedom they could provide to indi-
viduals trapped in barren outer-space worlds, devastated post-apocalyptic 
societies, and politically oppressive systems. In fact, he also suggested that 
some artificial realities that push aside our “actual reality” may not be artifi-
cial at all, but instead might be more real than what they replace. He also 
explored the havoc they could wreak on individuals when used as tools of 
manipulation, as failed therapeutic refuges, or when they leave individuals 
deeply disoriented and fundamentally confused about what is and is not real.
In this short essay, I draw on Dick’s explorations and discuss a number 
of reasons that the right to an artificial reality may need to be a limited one, 
and one governed by doctrine that not only protects an individual’s right to 
benefit from VR, but also her (and the larger community’s) right to benefit 
from certain constraints on VR. Such constraints might be necessary to pro-
tect individuals and the community from certain dangers that arise from arti-
ficial realities. Users might also need the constraints to assure that VR has 
the benefits a person or the larger community relies on it to provide.
I.  Self-Deception and the Argument Against First Amendment 
Coverage of Artificial Reality
Consider a simple argument that we should have a First Amendment 
right to immerse ourselves in the virtual world of an Experience Machine 
even if we are deceived—when inside of it—into perceiving the experience 
as real. Our natural dreaming already deceives us in this way: Dreamers of-
ten believe that a dream is real while they are experiencing it. But that does 
not mean that it would be constitutionally permissible for the government to 
somehow restrict our dreams or prevent us from remembering them. If indi-
viduals’ freedom of thought shields them as they immerse themselves in the 
illusory worlds in REM sleep, why not also when they immerse themselves 
in a designer dream produced by an Experience Machine?
14
Dreams can deceive us, but they do not usually present much competi-
tion for our waking life. Dreams are generally not remembered in detail and 
do not provide an environment in which a person can form the interpersonal 
relationships and career and other life plans that anchor, and give coherence 
and continuity to, our day-to-day existence. In some cases, perhaps, espe-
cially years after a vivid dream, we might struggle to remember whether 
certain events came from a dream or a real experience. But generally, when 
14. For a more extended discussion of how First Amendment freedom of thought might 
apply to hypothetical government restrictions of, or intervention into, natural dreaming, see 
Blitz, supra note 7, at 1179–85.
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we remember a dream after we awake, we can identify it as a dream—its 
bizarre and disconnected nature gives it away.
15
The simulated realities in science fiction, by contrast, do often compete 
and threaten to displace our day-to-day reality. In fact, simulated realities 
sometimes compete heavily with actual reality. Consider the virtual realities 
in The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch and We Can Remember It For 
You Wholesale, and many of Philip K. Dick’s other stories. In The Three 
Stigmata, colonists on Mars use a psychedelic drug, Can-D, to “translate”
themselves into figures in a dollhouse arrangement (a “layout”) where the 
colonists feel as though they are living in a town on a mid-twentieth century 
Earth.
16
At times, the Can-D users forget that there is a Martian world out-
side their drug-induced “layout” experience. One user even sends his virtual 
alter-ego a note to remind him that he is in a virtual experience and has lim-
ited time to enjoy it.
17
The same is true in We Can Remember It For You Wholesale, the story 
on which the movie Total Recall was based.18 It describes a technology not 
for generating perception of a false present, but rather for implanting 
memory of a false past. The protagonist of the story, Douglas Quail, des-
pairs of ever being able to afford a trip to Mars, and pays a company Rekal,
Inc. to implant in his brain vivid memories of such a visit.
19
Rekal’s service 
memory-design service does not simply carry a risk that the customer will 
mistakenly treat the memory as real—it is designed to ensure he does so.
20
Rekal erases the customer’s recollection of being at Rekal to hide the artifi-
cial process by which the implanted memory was created. It also offers to 
bolster Quail’s belief in the reality of his trip to Mars by creating other fake 
evidence of the trip, including a space travel ticket, photos from the trip, 
souvenirs, and a record of people he met on the voyage.
21
Quail sought not a 
simple private fantasy, but foolproof self-deception.
22
In each of these settings, individuals seek to place themselves firmly in 
the grip of an artificial hallucination. They believe that what they are expe-
riencing is real. If it is relatively straightforward to extend First Amendment 
15. See J. ALLEN HOBSON, DREAMING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SLEEP
63 (2002).
16. See Philip K. Dick, The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, in FOUR NOVELS OF 
THE 1960S, 297–325, 375–416 (Jonathan Lethem ed., 2007).
17. Id. at 269.
18. See Janet Maslin, Review/Film; A Schwarzenegger Torn Between Lives on Earth 
and Mars, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1990) (reviewing the 1990 version of the film Total Recall). 
19. See Philip K. Dick, We Can Remember It for You Wholesale, in SELECTED STORIES 
OF PHILIP K. DICK 330–31 (Pantheon Books 2002) (1966).
20. Id. at 330.
21. Id.
22. None of this goes as planned in the story. But my interest is not in exploring what 
goes wrong for Quail—and for Rekal—but in exploring if and how freedom of thought would 
apply to the service that Quail was seeking.
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freedom of thought to cover VR games and fantasies, it is less clear that 
such First Amendment freedom should cover extended hallucinations—
even if individuals voluntarily enter into them.
23
Moreover, as discussed more fully below, it is not clear that the changes 
wrought by such virtual realities would be as temporary as those we experi-
ence in natural dreaming. One can imagine visits to an Experience Machine 
that are strongly insulated from our life outside of it. As soon as we leave 
the Machine, we understand and can discount its experiences as false, just as 
we can generally set aside a dream and continue our lives upon waking.
However, some of the simulated realities in Dick’s worlds are not so 
ephemeral. The memory of Mars that Douglas Quail seeks to embed in his 
mind (and his sense of his own past) is meant to be permanent. Some of the 
false towns and home lives in which individuals find themselves living in 
Dick’s stories are not confined to a night of dreaming. They stretch across 
days, months, or years of a person’s waking life. This kind of transfor-
mation in one’s sense of reality, one might argue, lies beyond what the First 
Amendment protects. It is more akin to a person’s receiving psychosurgery 
to fundamentally alter who they are than it is like reading or writing a novel 
or immersing oneself in a film or video game.
This deeper transformation arguably makes the use of simulated reali-
ties more like the conduct that the First Amendment does not protect than 
the speech it does. In offering what she calls a “thinker-based account” of 
the First Amendment, Professor Seana Shiffrin offers one reason that the 
First Amendment might protect the expression of our thought in words but 
not in conduct such as violent aggression:
[A]s a general matter, communicative methods of transmitting 
mental contents generate the possibility of an intermediate work-
shop-like space in which one may experiment with, advance tenta-
tively, try on, revise, or reject a potential aspect or element of the 
self or of one’s potential history before directly affirming it through 
endorsement or implementation. One cannot preface, even implicit-
ly, one’s thrown punch with “maybe,” “consider the possibility,” 
or, “for now, this is my tentative judgment,” and thereby mitigate 
the seriousness of the assault or somehow soften the impact of 
one’s fist.
24
In the cases discussed above, VR is not an “intermediate workshop-like 
space” for us to “experiment” with one’s potential history. It is, as in Doug-
23. See Blitz, supra note 7, at 1229–33 (exploring harms VR could cause by causing 
individuals to confuse VR illusions with the real world).
24. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE 
LAW 114–15 (2014).
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las Quail’s case, a firm break what came before—a kind of self-
transformation that commits one to a different course.
II.  The First Amendment Value of Artificial Reality
But if the examples of artificial realities in Dick’s stories provide some 
support for such an argument for excluding artificial realities from the ambit 
of the First Amendment, other examples cut the other way. Specifically, 
Dick’s stories challenge at least two conditions implicit in Nozick’s hypo-
thetical.
The first is that we can do the things we enjoy doing inside the Experi-
ence Machine outside of it, and even if a real-life analogue is not quite as 
thrilling as its custom-designed alternative in the VR fantasy world, the ana-
logue will still be available and it will be real. Better to confront a real ath-
letic or intellectual challenge than an achievement brought to us courtesy of 
a programmed sequence of illusory experiences. Better to have frustrating 
conversations with imperfect friends in the real world than idyllic conversa-
tions with imaginary friends produced by a false VR experience. But what 
happens when what makes life most valuable is not to be found in any form 
in the real world? Full immersion (and perhaps, belief in) a virtual world 
may sometimes be the only source of certain rich experiences or perspec-
tives on life that we can’t obtain anywhere else. Many of Dick’s stories il-
lustrate how this can be the case.
Many of the individuals who seek out false realities do so under cir-
cumstances where false realities are arguably the only realities that can pro-
vide them with a sense of meaning. Nozick’s insistence that “we want to do
certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them,” might not 
ring true for those who do not have the option of doing those things outside 
of VR.
25
The hallucinations produced by Can-D in The Three Stigmata of 
Palmer Eldritch are generated by space colonists trapped on an incredibly 
bleak martial landscape—and the richness of the earth society they wish to 
explore is not only millions of miles away but also decades in the past.
26
Other stories feature space travelers who are trapped and isolated, without 
human contact for decades—and for whom hallucinatory VR-generated ex-
periences provide their only way to enjoy family life and friendship.
27
In one 
such story, space travelers are stranded in a damaged spaceship, condemned 
to age and die there—and the VR illusions provided by an imaginative and 
powerful provides them with the only way to experience different environ-
ments.
28
Similarly, the deceased “half-lifers” in Ubik have no stage for their 
25. Nozick, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added).
26. See Dick, supra note 16.
27. See, e.g., Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon, in I HOPE I SHALL ARRIVE 
SOON 456 (Mark Hurst & Paul Williams eds., 1985).
28. Philip K. Dick, A Maze of Death, in VALIS & LATER NOVELS 8–9, 163–75 (2007).
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experiences apart from their own minds.
29
In the physical world, they are 
already dead and cryogenically-frozen within a mausoleum, their only con-
tact with the outside world coming when a relative or friend comes to com-
municate with them at periodic intervals, which consequently use up small 
portions of their remaining consciousness. Between these visits, the de-
ceased “half-lifers” can often travel in hallucinatory environments that may 
in part be the product of somebody else’s design.
30
There are also less exotic examples of people for whom virtual reality 
may provide the only rich external environment. In his 1964 essay imagin-
ing of virtual reality or “phantomatics” might work, Stanislaw Lem de-
scribes how it might one day restore to “paraplegics, bedridden patients, 
[and] convalescents” the power of movement.
31
Even if we do not all have a 
right to plunge ourselves into an ongoing hallucinatory world, then, one 
might argue that some people do. This might at times be necessary for indi-
viduals to assure that they, not government officials, “control” what Frie-
drich Hayek describes as “the essential data [of their] individua[l] action.”
32
When the “data” for any valuable action a person might experience is only 
to be found in a simulated world, then perhaps it should be part of the indi-
vidual’s constitutionally-protected sphere.
In fact, one might argue that—at least in certain times and places—even 
individuals who are not in the isolation of a coma, marooned in space, or 
limited by severe physical disability might have a powerful need to immerse 
themselves in certain kinds of perceptual illusions. This is one lesson one 
might draw from parts of We Can Remember it for You Wholesale, Now 
Wait for Last Year, and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
Douglas Quail, the main figure in the first of these three stories, is not 
incapacitated or dying. But he is desperately unhappy and determined not to 
die without seeing Mars. He views himself as a “miserable little salaried 
employee,” with no hope of affording the voyage to Mars he is determined 
to make.
33
Unable to travel there physically, the only way he can make this 
experience a part of his life is with a virtual trip of sorts—namely, the artifi-
cial memory of Mars he recruits Rekal to implant.
In Now Wait for Last Year, a key character generates an artificial reality 
of sorts not to visit novel worlds but to revisit, and give vivid form to, deep-
ly meaningful episodes of childhood. Aged executive Virgil Ackerman has 
gone to great expense and effort to build on Mars a true-to-life model city 
called “Wash-35,” which is a recreation of the 1930s Washington, D.C. 
29. See Philip K. Dick, Ubik, in FOUR NOVELS OF THE 1960S 620, 788–89 (Jonathan 
Lethem ed., 2007).
30. Id. at 612–15.
31. Swirski, supra note 13, at 90.
32. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 139 (1960).
33. Dick, supra note 19, at 328, 330–31.
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from his youth.
34
Wash-35 is filled with replicas of the comic bookstores 
and theaters that were the highlights of his childhood, as well as robots (or 
“robants”) that look and sound exactly like the friends and adult figures he 
knew then. While some of Ackerman’s family and colleagues are contemp-
tuous of his need to immerse himself in this nostalgic recreation, the protag-
onist, Eric Sweetscent, is more sympathetic. Sweetscent defends Ackerman 
when Ackerman’s nephew complains that the people represented by lifelike 
figures they meet in Wash-35 have, in reality, “been dead a century,” and 
that the nephew likes “things to appear as they really are.” He stresses (to 
the nephew and to himself) that Ackerman’s attempt to preserve 1930s 
Washington is not any stranger or more worthy of condemnation than pre-
serving a long-ago concert performance in an audio recording. “We live 
with illusion daily,” he goes on to reflect, “When the first bard rattled off 
the first epic of a sometime battle, illusion entered our lives; the Iliad is as 
much a ‘fake’ as those robant children trading postage stamps on the porch 
of the building [in Wash-35].”
35
Reconstructed realities then can serve cru-
cial aspirations and emotional needs even for those many individuals who—
unlike stranded space voyagers, dead-but-still-sentient “half-lifers,” and in-
dividuals confined by illness—are capable of moving through, and interact-
ing with, their physical environments.
To be sure, Ackerman’s reconstructed childhood haunts in Wash-35 are 
not designed to crowd out his current reality. At the same time Ackerman is 
enjoying his trip down memory lane he is able to deal with the business and 
political demands of the present.
36
But one finds a stronger defense of even 
deceptive false perceptions in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (the 
basis for the movie, Blade Runner). In the novel, characters in a post-
apocalyptic America maintain their capacity for empathy with others in part 
by practicing a religion called “Mercerism.” One ritual they practice in this 
religion involves entering a VR-type experience through something called a 
“fusion box.” While using the box, they experience the world from the per-
spective of a savior figure, Wilbur Mercer—and they are not there alone, 
but are sharing this experience with numerous others who have also “fused”
into it from wherever they are, using their own fusion boxes. Mentally 
joined with the virtual Mercer, the participants feel Mercer’s pain as he is 
perpetually pelted with stones while he climbs an endless hill. Mercer is not 
simply a virtual character, however. His adherents have learned that he was 
a real person who had been persecuted by authorities after manifesting a 
power to resurrect the dead. Near the end of Dick’s tale, the biography of 
this savior is revealed to be a hoax: The man who appears as Mercer was 
34. Philip K. Dick, Now Wait for Last Year, in FIVE NOVELS OF THE 1960S & 70S,
481–84 (Jonathan Lethem ed., 2008).
35. Id. at 483–84.
36. Id. at 491, 510.
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actually an obscure character actor paid to create the films on a sound stage. 
The virtual Mercer then acknowledges his fraudulent origin to shaken fol-
lowers but insists that he remains real to those who fuse with him. The sto-
ry’s protagonist, Rick Deckard, seems to adhere to this view, stating near 
the end of the story that “Mercer isn’t a fake . . . [u]nless reality is a fake,”
and that after fusing, he “can’t stop being Mercer.”
37
One complication in drawing lessons from these stories is that the virtu-
al world of the stories is not clearly artificial in the same sense as that of VR 
worlds, or that of the Experience Machine. Mercer is not solely a hallucina-
tion. In some respects, he seems sentient and able to shape the reality that 
exists outside the “fusion” experience. However, Dick’s stories can at least 
prompt reflection on the challenges that VR and other technologies for gen-
erating artificial reality pose for First Amendment rights—not only to free-
dom of thought but also freedom of speech and religious liberty. Is the value 
that individuals can find in artificial realities value that the First Amend-
ment protects?
Consider first the right to freedom of speech. Virtual reality and other 
emerging technologies such as “deepfake” videos now allow us to make the 
unreal seem increasingly vivid and real.
38
To what extent can individuals 
take advantage of such technologies to design—and believe in—their own 
realities? The Supreme Court held in United States v. Alvarez that individu-
als have a First Amendment right to tell autobiographical lies. Congress 
cannot punish individuals who falsely claim to have won military awards, as 
it did when it enacted the Stolen Valor Act (which the Court struck down in 
Alvarez).39 But that leaves open questions about whether and how Alvarez 
extends to emerging technologies. Are individuals protected by the First 
Amendment not only as they immerse themselves in false autobiographies, 
but also—like Douglas Quail—use VR to make these autobiographies seem 
real? Are they constitutionally protected when they coax friends or others to 
join them in these high-tech illusions?
One might also ask whether such sculpting of our encounters with reali-
ty might be protected by the First Amendment’s right to the free exercise of 
one’s religion. Many of the simulated realities in Dick’s stories have a reli-
gious function. Mercerism in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep has a 
“theological and moral structure,” while the colonists who use Can-D in The 
Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch similarly think about this practice in re-
ligious terms: Those who believe the dollhouse layout can never be any-
thing more than a toy-like model of Earth are viewed as “unbelievers” by
37. Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, in FOUR NOVELS OF THE 
1960S 448–51, 583, 587, 601 (Jonathan Lethem ed., 2007).
38. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1757 (2019).
39. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 709 (2012).
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the faithful.
40
Some of the space travelers’ virtual reality experiences in A
Maze of Death are likewise woven around invented religions.41
How might our existing legal framework for religious liberty apply to 
such simulated realities? Although the Constitution has not prevented the 
government from extending a “neutral law of general applicability” to reli-
gious practices that use psychoactive substances,
42
the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act has barred the federal government from subjecting such 
drug use to incidental burdens unless it can satisfy strict scrutiny.
43
Is there a 
constitutional right to proselytize not merely with arguments, but by creat-
ing perceptual experiences, memories, or feelings that bolster the religious 
beliefs? Do individuals have a First Amendment right to be an audience for 
such virtual-reality aided proselytizing? Or is it also the case that govern-
ment has a responsibility to protect individuals against being influenced by 
it in ways that might be manipulative or deceptive?
As is the case for freedom of speech, one important question is whether 
the balance between an individual’s right to immerse herself in an artificial
reality and the government’s need to protect her from the dangers of VR 
might be struck differently in different environments. One assumption 
courts and legal thinkers often make in cases on free speech and religious 
liberty is that individuals must be left free to compare different belief sys-
tems in a “marketplace of ideas,” or free to radically revise their religious 
beliefs. That freedom may well be diminished when individuals lock them-
selves into a simulated reality that is specifically designed to affirm only 
one such belief system.
Dick’s stories prompt the question of whether, in certain very different 
social or physical conditions, individuals might not only need to enter (and, 
at least briefly believe in) simulated realities—but also need that simulation 
to support certain habits of thinking. It is not clear, for example, how well 
those who live in Rick Deckard’s post-apocalyptic world can derive value 
from the “fusion” they experience if it is not delivered with experiences that 
affirm Mercerism’s beliefs and commitments.
III.  Artificial Reality as an Enhancement of Brain-Generated 
Reality
Philip K. Dick’s stories also raise another challenge to wholly exclud-
ing the artificial hallucinations of the Experience Machine from the First 
Amendment’s scope. Not only are these hallucinations to some extent like 
natural dreaming, they are also in some respects like the natural processing 
40. Dick, supra note 37, at 441; Dick, supra note 16, at 263.
41. Dick, supra note 28, at 8, 163.
42. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
43. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356–57 (2015) (noting that the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act imposes strict scrutiny on federal laws that incidentally burden religion).
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the brain does in our waking life. As I wrote earlier, Nozick draws a stark 
contrast between experiencing something in one’s mind and doing it in the 
outside world.
44
Many science fiction stories about virtual reality seem to 
emphasize a similar dichotomy. In the Matrix, for example, Neo and Mor-
pheus lead a group that wishes to free humans from being imprisoned in a 
computer-generated virtual reality.
45
In eXistenZ, “realist” terrorists seek to 
attack, and destroy the products of biotech companies that allow people to 
enter intricate virtual reality games.
46
But in Dick’s stories, the line between simulation and external reality is 
often a blurry one. The blurriness is rooted in part in Dick’s doubts about 
whether hallucinations or other illusory experiences might be just as, if not 
more, real than our normal day-to-day experiences. In one essay, for exam-
ple, he wrote that “plural realities” might “exist superimposed onto one an-
other like so many film transparencies,” and that some experiences that 
seem like hallucinations that tear us away from a single external reality, are 
simply shifting us into a different one.
47
Intrigued by gnostic and Neopla-
tonist thinking positing that one could find a more authentic reality outside 
the material world, he suggested that the reality we perceive most of our 
waking life is a “spurious” one, with an “authentic . . . normally undetected 
substratum of reality” lying underneath.
48
It is highly unlikely (to say the 
least) that courts and legal thinkers would build First Amendment law 
around the possibility that our day-to-day experience could be an illusion.
But there is a more modest challenge to this distinction one can draw 
from Dick’s stories. Even if hallucinations aren’t visions of worlds underly-
ing or existing beside our own, they are arguably sometimes a variation on 
familiar, inevitable, and valuable components of human life.
As one of Dick’s characters says in Now Wait For Last Year, the vivid 
recreation of 1935 Washington in Wash-35 shouldn’t strike us as all that 
novel or frightening when we have “live[d] with illusion daily” since the Il-
iad.49
And one might argue that the technology for generating illusions within 
the brain goes back even further because the capacity to weave together a 
synthetic reality is built into the brain’s biology itself. Our mind does not 
simply passively absorb and convey an external reality—it actively shapes
44. Nozick, supra note 1, at 43.
45. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
46. EXISTENZ (Alliance Atlantis Communications 1999).
47. Philip K. Dick, If You Find This World Bad, in THE SHIFTING REALITIES OF PHILIP 
K. DICK: SELECTED LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 240 (Lawrence Sutin ed., 
1995).
48. Philip K. Dick, Cosmogony and Cosmology, in THE SHIFTING REALITIES OF PHILIP 
K. DICK: SELECTED LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 287 (Lawrence Sutin ed., 
1995).
49. Dick, supra note 34, at 481–84.
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our experience of it.
50
Thus, rather than seeing VR as a radical break with 
the way we normally experience reality, we might see it as another tool to 
let us sculpt, a little more deliberately, experiences that are already in large 
part the product of how brains construct our perceptions and memories (and 
reconstruct the latter).
Such a consideration has already played a role in debates over memory-
dampening drugs. In response to the critique of memory-dampening in the 
2003 report of President Bush’s President’s Council on Bioethics, Professor 
Adam Kolber has argued that individuals should often have the freedom to 
chemically-erase their traumatic memories with propranolol or other new 
drugs.
51
In one part of his argument, he notes that memory erasure is not
simply an artificial process because the brain already fails to preserve many 
memories and reshapes others. If it would be wrong to force individuals to 
take measures that preserve memories they do not wish to preserve (from 
natural forgetting), Kolber observes, then in at least some circumstances it 
might likewise be wrong to bar individuals from using artificial means of 
forgetting to lose the same memories.
52
The question I focus on here is different: Do we have a right to add
false memories instead of erasing those we have formed on the basis of ob-
servations? One might argue that what an individual is doing with an im-
planted memory (like that in We Can Build You Your Dreams Wholesale) is 
simply an artificial variant of something that already occurs naturally.
53
Our 
natural memory might mistakenly merge two separate events into one, 
wrongly placing a friend or family member in an encounter they never par-
ticipated in, or misclassifying a dream as an actual event.
54
To what extent 
then can we claim that, if such mistakes of memory are going to happen an-
yway, we should have a right to shape how they happen?
55
Indeed, one of 
the unusual guarantees that Rekal gives to Douglas Quail in the story is that 
the Mars voyage memory they plant will be superior to natural memory, 
“with all its vagueness, omissions, and ellipses, not to say distortions.”
56
It 
will be an artificial memory with such “deep implantation of recall that 
nothing is forgotten.”
57
Therefore, one question we may ask in addressing 
whether technologically-enabled reality distortion should receive any con-
stitutional protection is to what extent such technology-enabled reality dis-
50. See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the 
Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739–60 (2009).
51. See generally Kolber, supra note 9.
52. Id. at 1610–11.
53. Dick, supra note 19, at 331.
54. See generally ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHUM, THE MYTH OF 
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1994).
55. Id.
56. Dick, supra note 19, at 331–32.
57. Id. at 331.
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tortion is different from the natural reality distortion our mind already cre-
ates.
IV.  The Harms to Oneself and Others: Undermining 
Obligations and Enabling Manipulation
The previous sections asked whether using an Experience Machine can 
be an exercise of freedom of thought even though we do not experience it as 
mere thinking and are rather deceived into believing it was a real experi-
ence. But even if such self-deception does not automatically rule out or re-
quire substantial limits on First Amendment protection, we should also ask 
if some of the harms that flow from it might.
One such harm is akin to those Nozick focuses on in his Experience 
Machine hypothetical: The loss that comes with being disconnected from 
real people and real activities. This point has also been central to some re-
cent critiques of cognition-enhancement and memory-alteration. As noted 
earlier, the 2003 Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics warns 
against responding to unpleasant memories or emotions by simply dulling 
them, and urges us to avoid a future where individuals chemically banish 
negative experiences and emotions instead of dealing with them.
58
And Dick 
highlights this worry by imagining how a futuristic device, the Penfield 
Mood Organ, might let people alter their emotions (including anger at, or 
affection toward, others) with the twist of a dial.
59
Other science fiction writers have explored concerns over how virtual 
realities might feed a hunger for sexually explicit or violent material. Sci-
ence fiction writers have long raised alarm about the possibility that VR 
might normalize violence by making it a more familiar part of life. In his 
1964 essay, for example, Stanislaw Lem warned that VR will allow human 
beings to conjure “frenzies of nihilistic obscenities . . . limited only by im-
agination.”
60
James Gunn’s 1961 book, The Joy Makers, describes a dysto-
pian world where people relentlessly maximize pleasure by seeking out pro-
grammed psychological experiences.
61
Dick also describes similar possible 
uses of VR in his fiction, and the oddity of libertarian stance on VR leaving 
people with unlimited freedom to perform acts that, in any other context, 
would be morally repulsive and subject to legal constraint. In The Three 
Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, he notes that people can use the drug-powered 
VR in that world to “commit incest, murder, anything” and it would, due to 
58. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 207 (2003). See also RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW BRAIN:
HOW THE MODERN AGE IS REWIRING YOUR MIND 138 (2003) (describing requests by pa-
tients for drugs to dampen grief after the death of a relative).
59. Dick, supra note 37, at 435–38.
60. Swirski, supra note 13, at 87.
61. See generally JAMES GUNN, THE JOY MAKERS (Wilder Publi’ns 2010) (1961).
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its virtual nature, “remain[n] from a juridical standpoint a mere fantasy” in-
sulated against state restriction.
62
However, it is unlikely that such worries would provide a basis for sus-
pending any First Amendment protection that VR experiences might other-
wise receive. As a general matter, the First Amendment does not allow the 
government to restrict speech on the basis of the paternalistic justification 
that it has to steer people away from unworthwhile activity. The courts 
made this clear in rejecting California’s ban on violent video games. The 
Ninth Circuit stressed that while the government might be allowed to regu-
late video games it could show caused neurological harm, the government is 
not permitted to regulate video games for the purpose of controlling video 
game players’ thoughts or mental experiences.
63
It is conceivable that vio-
lent experiences in an immersive 3D experience will have less First 
Amendment protections than similar experiences in two-dimensional mov-
ies. As Eugene Volokh and Mark Lemley point out, “[w]e base many [legal] 
rules on the distinction between the mental and the visceral, between things 
we perceive and things we experience” and the violence we encounter in an 
Experience Machine would, of course, seem more real than that on a movie 
screen.
64
It is designed to be experienced, not just seen or perceived.
I will focus the remainder of the Article on two potential harms that are 
most likely to give courts pause in extending First Amendment rights to VR:
societal obligations and manipulation.
A. Societal Obligations
Even when people willingly choose to enter a false reality of their own 
design, implant a false memory in their head, or erase a memory of events 
they have actually experienced, such actions can cause harm. In the concep-
tual language of John Stuart Mill’s framework in On Liberty, even our sol-
ipsistic fantasy life in the Experience Machine is not always an experience
that concerns only the Machine-user herself.
65
If we continue to view events 
we see and hear in the Experience Machine even after we emerge from it—
if we continue to have a false memory we have implanted or, from that 
62. Dick, supra note 16, at 268. See also Blitz, supra note 7, at 1146–47 (describing 
how VR could “make reprehensible violence seem normal, familiar and acceptable”). Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Society also worries that “it will 
not be long before video-game images will be seen in three dimensions . . . provide sensory 
feedback” and thus allow users to experience extreme violence rather than simply watch it. 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 816–17 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).
63. See Video Software Deals Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 962 (2009).
64. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2018).
65. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS 30 (John Gray & G.W. 
Smith eds., 1991).
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point on, lack a memory we have erased—then this will affect our interac-
tions with other people and our ability to fulfill our obligations to society.
This raises interesting questions of law and policy: Can users or design-
ers of VR experiences or memory manipulations be liable for defamation
(or another tort) if a user intentionally deceives themself into thinking that 
another person is responsible for a wrong which that person did not com-
mit? Imagine, for example, that we seek to assuage our guilt over past mis-
treatment of a friend or family member by implanting a false memory prov-
ing that they are responsible for wrongdoing that deserves that 
mistreatment.
False memories and fabricated experiences raise additional problems 
when they interfere with duties that we owe to society. Consider what artifi-
cial memory—or erasure of memory—might mean for the right of the judi-
cial system to “every man’s evidence.”
66
Trials cannot deliver justice unless 
they can obtain reliable evidence about the events underlying a criminal or 
civil trial—and this often requires testimony from witnesses. When we 
serve as a witness in a trial, we need to have accurate memories—not simp-
ly for our own benefit, but for the benefit of society.
For this reason, even as he presents a vigorous argument in favor of 
what he calls “freedom of memory,” Kolber argues that we cannot have an 
unlimited right to dampen or erase any memory we find unpleasant: Our 
memories are “not entirely our own.” A witness to a crime may have an ob-
ligation to accurately remember that crime and share her memory with a ju-
ry.
67
Of course, witness memories are imperfect and inevitably often inaccu-
rate; however, that does not mean that individuals can intentionally use 
technology to erase, weaken or distort their memories of events at issue in a 
trial. In short, no person’s mind is an island, even in a world of Experience 
Machines and technology for sculpting one’s own memory.
68
Dick’s stories 
explore how memory manipulation may be used to intentionally undercut 
law enforcement investigations, trials, or attempts by citizens to understand 
their government. Even police investigators equipped with telepathic ca-
pacities (like those in The Gameplayers of Titan) sometimes find their in-
vestigations hampered by methodical memory-erasing that has occurred to 
hide evidence of the crime.
69
66. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating that the “‘the pub-
lic . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’”).
67. See Adam Kolber, Freedom of Memory Today, 2008 NEUROETHICS 145–48 (2008); 
see also Kolber, supra note 9, at 1589–92 (discussing how erasing memories could constitute 
obstruction of justice).
68. See John Donne, No Man Is an Island, GEOFF JOHNSTON: MY FAVOURITE POETRY,
https://web.cs.dal.ca/~johnston/poetry/island.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
69. See PHILIP K. DICK, THE GAME-PLAYERS OF TITAN 63–75 (Gregg Press 1979) 
(1963).
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It is not only in trials that we rely on individuals to remain anchored in 
a shared reality. Many writers who lament modern-day disinformation cam-
paigns on social media have been stressing the extent to which a well-
functioning democracy depends on citizens living in the same reality. In a 
2016 piece, for example, one writer stresses that “[public] knowledge, com-
posed of facts and an understanding of their limits, are critical for a func-
tioning democracy,” and that democracy relies on citizens having a “shared 
reality.”
70
As Jonathan Rauch observes, given that in free societies the state 
does not ordain what is true and false, democracy depends on a decentral-
ized system for the “constitution of knowledge.” This system, he writes, re-
lies on certain norms that he calls an “an epistemic honor code: Objective 
truth exists; efforts to find it should be impersonal; credentials matter; what 
hasn’t been tested isn’t knowledge; and so on.”
71
Disinformation campaigns 
on social media can severely undermine such norms—and undermine the 
public deliberation on which democracy relies by “spreading lies and disin-
formation on an industrial scale, they sow confusion about what might or 
might not be true, and about who can be relied on to discern the difference, 
and about whether there is any difference.”
72
One might think, given the amount of disinformation that has already 
spread on social media, that emerging technologies of memory manipula-
tion, “deepfake” videos, and other fabricated realities will make little differ-
ence here. However, one of the threats of the latter technologies is that they 
can conceivably detach a person from a democracy’s shared reality even if 
they do generally adhere to Rauch’s epistemic honor code. A person who 
rejects disinformation because it is clearly at odds with the reality they see 
(in their own observations, video evidence, or experts they trust), won’t be 
able to filter out such false information when their perceptions are them-
selves contaminated by falsehood, where even the best video evidence can 
be fake, or where the trusted expert who assured them of a fact wasn’t the 
real person, but a facsimile in an Experience Machine fantasy or a false 
memory.
With such considerations in mind, Philip K. Dick’s simulated realities 
seem worrisome in another way. Many of the hallucinations Dick imagines 
are intersubjective. One of the safeguards confusing a dream with reality is 
that the dream is private and personal. Nobody else in our physical envi-
ronment has been privy to our dream sequence and no one will regard it as 
real. By contrast, the illusions of Dick’s stories are often communal, such as 
small towns where most or all of the town’s residents perceive a world that 
70. Adam Frank, Politics and Fracturing of Shared Reality, NPR (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2016/04/12/473850478/politics-and-the-fracturing-of-
shared-reality.
71. Jonathan Rauch, The Constitution of Knowledge, 45 NAT’L AFFS. (Fall 2020), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-constitution-of-knowledge.
72. Id.
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isn’t really there.
73
Or simulated worlds where multiple VR users are given 
extensive knowledge of a false history and a deep sense of familiarity with 
(and reliance on) fictional religious and cultural frameworks generated by 
the VR world. In one story, The Unteleported Man, anxious authorities 
nervously monitor the hallucinatory worlds generated in certain individuals’
minds for any signs that they might extend beyond that individual’s private 
mental universe. Such a world, the protagonist is informed, “wouldn’t just 
be real . . . in the experiential sense . . . if one of the experiences is common 
to more than a single individual the implications are quite great . . . It would 
be coming true” and potentially “[r]eplacing” the reality they inhabit.
74
This is somewhat counterintuitive. The intersubjective nature of an arti-
ficial reality makes it far more valuable than the solipsism of the Experience 
Machine. Rather than being entirely alone with one’s illusions, one retains 
in such simulations the contact with others and with community that is lack-
ing in a virtual experience where everyone except the subject is a phantasm. 
On the other hand, the collective nature of a shared hallucination can make 
it seem more real. If, as Dick quotes himself as saying in VALIS, reality 
might be defined as “that which when you stop believing in it, it doesn’t go 
away,” then others’ affirmation of a belief provides reassurance that it 
doesn’t depend solely on one’s continued belief in it.
75
In this sense, communal participation in a false reality can make it a 
high-tech equivalent of “filter bubbles” on the Internet. Users of Facebook, 
Twitter, and other social media sites often gravitate first and foremost to-
wards sources of information they agree with, and then rely heavily (some-
times exclusively) on those sites to inform them about public life. What they 
come to view as the truth is thus ideologically filtered by their choice of 
venues. As one writer says, “[c]ommunities share and create social realities”
and “[i]n its current role, social media risks abetting a social reality where 
differing groups could disagree not only about what to do, but about what 
reality is.”
76
Moreover, adherents of implausible conspiracy theories might 
be more likely, thanks to Internet and social media, to find others who agree 
with them and bolster their beliefs in these conspiracy theories.
This problem may present an even greater threat to a democratic repub-
lic in a world where individuals not only rely on internet filter bubbles for 
false verbal reports, but also on reality fabrication services to provide a pre-
ferred experience of reality. To the extent that “fusion boxes” of Rick Deck-
73. PHILIP K. DICK, THE COSMIC PUPPETS 1–6, 12, 54–55 (First Mariner Books 2012) 
(1957).
74. PHILIP K. DICK, THE UNTELEPORTED MAN 127–28 (Berkeley Books 1983) (1966).
75. Philip K. Dick, VALIS, in VALIS & LATER NOVELS 240 (Jonathan Lethem ed., 
2009).
76. Gordon Hull, Why Social Media May Not Be So Good for Democracy,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 5, 2017), https://theconversation.com/why-social-media-may-not-be-
so-good-for-democracy-86285.
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ard’s world are used not to instill empathy, but to help give firm rooting to 
communal falsehoods, they might be far more worrisome than a single per-
son’s temporary stay in an Experience Machine. Indeed, other stories by 
Dick imagine the harm such communal falsehoods can do. Often, it is an 
authoritarian government or malevolent corporation that is responsible. The 
authoritarian society of The Galactic Pot Healer imposes “mandatory 
dreaming” on all its citizens, using scripts to instill patriotic sentiments.
77
In 
The Unteleported Man, residents of Earth are bombarded with fake video 
feeds to induce them to immigrate—through a teleportation device that only 
works one way—to a seemingly idyllic outer space colony (from which no 
one has ever returned.).
78
B. Manipulation
Another obviously problematic use of artificial realities is as a tool of 
manipulation. It may, perhaps, be an exercise of freedom of thought for us 
to use an Experience Machine to live a false life that we have designed for 
ourselves. By contrast, it seems a deep violation of that mental freedom 
when we are condemned to live in a universe over which someone else ex-
ercises God-like control. That is certainly the case when the external shaper 
of our mental experience is the government; however, it is also true when 
the God-like manipulator of our world is a private individual or company. 
This situation is a common scenario in Dick’s stories. In Ubik, for example, 
the protagonist, Joe Chip, realizes that he and his colleagues are being pur-
sued by a seemingly supernatural force that seems intent on eliminating 
them one-by-one, and toying with their perceptions as it does so.
79
However, 
this God-like force is revealed to be no more of a deity than the other char-
acters. In The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, users of the new and 
powerful hallucinogenic, Chew-Z, find that the industrialist and business-
man who is promoting the drug after his return from Proxima Centauri 
(Palmer Eldritch) is not only pushing the drug—but seems to appear in and 
control the hallucinogenic sequences the drug generates, often with frighten-
ing consequences for the user.
80
To be sure, one might argue that these examples are a bit of a digression 
from the focus of the essay—which is whether we have a First Amendment 
right to voluntarily immerse ourselves in an artificial reality, not on whether 
others have a right to trap and torment us there. However, that does not 
mean that worries about VR-enabled manipulation are irrelevant here.
First, even when entry into a VR world or other artificial reality is vol-
untary, the risk of manipulation is still likely to be in the background. More 
77. PHILIP K. DICK, THE GALACTIC POT-HEALER 20–22 (Mariner Books 2013) (1969).
78. Dick, supra note 74, at 11–12.
79. See Dick, supra note 29, at 771.
80. See Dick, supra note 16, at 301.
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specifically, assuring that individuals are free from such a risk may be diffi-
cult in any setting where the person who experiences the VR world is dif-
ferent from the person who designs it. A VR user who experiences the VR 
environment as real will not understand they have the power to pause the 
experience—and ask for it to be redesigned or altered. People do not, after 
all, typically feel we can hit a pause button when we are dissatisfied with 
day-to-day life in physical reality. So it is not clear how this would occur 
when a VR world or memory designed for us is ill-fitting (even if uninten-
tionally so).
The dangers of even benevolent manipulation by an AI-entity or hu-
man-aid giver are also highlighted in some of Dick’s stories. In The Man 
Who Japed, Dick explores how virtual reality technology might be used in 
futuristic psychotherapy: A therapist uses a kind of memory-retrieval and 
display system to review the memory of his patient.
81
Things take an even 
stranger turn when the patient, after losing consciousness in his therapist’s
office, wakes up with a new identity, wife, child, and unfamiliar home in the 
Chicago of another era—a shift in reality that is meant to help the patient, 
but does more harm than good. In I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon, an artificially 
intelligent spaceship strives to aid a space traveler erroneously awakened 
from a faulty cryonic suspension by replaying his own pleasant memories 
for the remaining ten years of his voyage. But the spaceship soon finds that 
it is complex and perilous identifying what counts as “pleasant” in a com-
plex, interconnected web of memories and repressed emotions.
82
Shielding individuals from virtual manipulation might also become 
more challenging if individuals continue to shift many activities they have 
traditionally carried out in the physical world into analogous virtual settings. 
When consumer activity occurs in virtual shopping malls, for example, 
questions arise about whether a virtual reality product or service might ille-
gally mislead consumers about the non-virtual product or service it is adver-
tising.
83
However, if this virtual interface for examining a product is the on-
ly medium available for doing so, then somebody other than the consumer 
(whether it is a human or AI entity) will have to design and control the us-
er’s experience—with the risk that they steer that user in ways that are un-
ethical or harmful. Similarly, if other activities—conferences with col-
leagues, travel with friends and family, or outings to concerts and theater 
performances—likewise occur in some virtual reality experiences, there will 
81. See PHILIP K. DICK, THE MAN WHO JAPED 55–69, 89–104 (First Mariner 2012) 
(1956). The therapist’s apparent ability to view the content of the patient’s memory is not un-
like that which the characters in Harry Potter have to explore each other’s memories with pen-
sive devices.
82. Dick, supra note 27, at 459–62.
83. See Yusef Al-Jarani, All Fun and (Mind) Games? Protecting Consumers from the 
Manipulative Harms of Interactive Virtual Reality, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 299, 310 
(2019).
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be a risk of manipulation or distortion, which the government has an interest 
in regulating and preventing. The First Amendment’s free speech protection 
shouldn’t disable government from preventing such manipulation.
84
CONCLUSION
We can draw some tentative conclusions from these reflections on 
whether we have the right to immerse ourselves in a false reality. It is often 
impossible to provide detailed answers to questions about what constitu-
tional or other legal rules should govern science fiction VR technologies un-
til we get a clearer sense of how such technology will work when it be-
comes scientific fact. The doctrines that evolve around particular 
constitutional rights will often depend on social conventions and technolog-
ical architecture that constrain the exercise of such rights, and this is as true 
for the right to freedom of thought as it is for other rights.
We might, however, at least offer modest starting points, drawing on 
the reflections of Philip K. Dick and other science fiction writers. On the 
one hand, some uses of the Experience Machine to live in an artificial pre-
sent, or of memory modification to generate an artificial past, seem to fall 
squarely within the realm of freedom of thought. This possibility is certainly 
true of a VR world that allows one to have an experience without having to 
believe in its veracity; however, even when a virtual world appears real, that 
does not automatically mean it should be outside the First Amendment’s
scope. Some of what we might do with VR is only an updated version of 
what our brain does naturally (as it shapes our memory and experience), and 
of what human culture has done in other ways to let us “live with illusion 
daily.”
85
Some of this shaping of experience is not only familiar—it is a 
necessary part of helping individuals meet deeply-felt needs to preserve a 
comforting past or survive an oppressive present.
On the other hand, even if Experience Machine-like transformations 
have value in our lives—including First Amendment value—that does not 
mean that society will never have a claim to guard against the harms they 
might cause. If Dick’s stories emphasize how artificial realities might enrich 
and sustain life, they also illustrate how they can lead to nightmarish disori-
entation or subjugation. Where a VR world does not supplement, or provide 
a resource for, our lives in real communities and in attacking genuine prob-
84. It already leaves government with leeway to protect individuals from deception that 
would cause financial harm—for example, by allowing government to compel advertisers to 
disclose “factual and uncontroversial” information where the lack of such information would 
cause consumer deception—see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985)—and where commercial advertising is otherwise misleading.
85. Dick, supra note 34, at 484. For commercial speech to come within the First 
Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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lems, but rather crowds it out, the government should be left with room for 
protecting us from being swallowed whole by such an artificial world. It 
might also ensure that what we do to ourselves does not undercut the obliga-
tions we have to the justice system and to others. Where a VR world does 
not enhance our freedom of thought, but rather puts our mental experience 
under someone else’s control, First Amendment interests might not only al-
low the government to defend individual autonomy—it might require it.
